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Introduction
The Basle II regulatory formula (see Basle, 2006) aims to provide a sufficiently robust estimate of unexpected losses on banking credit exposures that should be covered by the capital. It is a compromise between the most advanced mathematical modeling techniques and the demand for a practical implementation. One of the most important simplifications is the decision to calculate unexpected losses (UL) using an estimate of the Unexpected Default Rate (UDR) multiplied through by the expected Loss Given Default parameter (LGD), i.e.
UL=UDR⋅LGD. The capital requirement (C) as a percentage out of the exposure is then set equal to the difference between the unexpected and expected loss (EL), C = UL-EL = (UDR-PD)⋅LGD, where PD is the expected default rate, i.e. the probability of default.
While the expected default rate estimation based on the Vasicek (1987) approach is considered to be relatively robust, the resulting estimation of the unexpected loss has been criticized for neglecting the unexpected LGD (or equivalently recovery) risk. It has been empirically shown in a series of papers by Altman et al. (see e.g. 2004) , Gupton et al. (2000) , Frye (2000b Frye ( , 2003 , or Acharya et al. (2007) that there is not only a significant systemic variation of recovery rates but moreover a negative correlation between frequencies of default and recovery rates, or equivalently a positive correlation between frequencies of default and losses given default. Consequently the regulatory formula significantly underestimates the unexpected loss on the targeted confidence probability level (99.9%) and the time horizon (one year). Some authors have proposed alternative unexpected loss formulas incorporating the impact recovery risk variation. Frye (2000a Frye ( , 2000b has used a single systemic factor model with an idiosyncratic factor driving the event of default and another independent idiosyncratic factor driving the recovery rate. The loading of the systemic factor for modeling of default and recovery rates may differ.
The recovery rate is modeled as a normal variable truncated at 100%. Frye does not provide an analytical formula but analyzes robustness of the loss estimates using Monte Carlo simulation for different combinations of the input parameters. The parameters are also estimated using the maximum likelihood method from the Moody's Risk Service Default database. Alternatively Dullmann and Trapp (2004) apply the logit transformation for recovery modeling in the same set up as Frye. Pykhtin (2003) considers a single systemic factor model where default is driven by a systemic factor and an idiosyncratic factor while recovery is driven not only by the systemic factor and an independent idiosyncratic factor, but at the same time by another idiosyncratic factor driving the obligor's default. The collateral (recovery) value is set to have a lognormal distribution. Pykhtin arrives to an analytic formula which requires numerical approximations of the bivariate normal cumulative distribution values. The author admits that calibration of the model is difficult. Tasche (2004) proposes a single factor approach modeling directly the loss function. If there is no default the value of the loss function is zero and if there is a default (the systemic factor exceeds the default threshold) the value of the loss is drawn from a distribution as a function the systemic factor. The obligor factor is decomposed as usual into the systemic and idiosyncratic factor. In other words the single obligor factor is used to model the event of default and the loss given default as well. Tasche proposes to model LGD by a beta distribution. Quantiles of the loss function conditional on the systemic factor values may be expressed as an integral over a tail of the normally distributed factor. Tasche proposes to approximate the integral using Gauss quadrature and tests the model for different PD, mean/variance LGD, and correlation values. The approach is also elaborated in Kim (2006) . This study is motivated not only by the fact that the Basle II formula significantly underestimates the unexpected credit losses but also by the observation according to which the regulatory capital requirement depends on the definition of default which in a sense puts a border line between the PD and LGD parameters. This phenomenon has been analyzed in Witzany (2008) using a Merton model based simulation. To give a more tractable analytical explanation we will apply the Tasche and Frye single factor models as benchmarks against which we analyze the sensitivity of the regulatory formula. At the same time we propose a simple specification of the regulatory formula in order to eliminate the problem. We propose to preserve the formula UL=UDR⋅LGD as well as the regulatory formula for unexpected default rate (UDR), but to reinterpret the parameter LGD as the 99.9% quantile of possible portfolio loss given default values. The Basle (2005) document goes in this direction requiring
LGD estimates to incorporate potential economic downturn conditions and adverse dependencies between default rates and recovery rates but fails to specify the confidence probability level of those conservative estimations. We argue that any probability level below 99.9% preserves the problem definition of default sensitivity (and underestimation of the 99.9% loss function percentile) while the 99.9% LGD quantile solves the problem under reasonable modeling assumptions. We propose a single factor beta distribution based technique calibrated with account level LGD mean, variance, cure rate and a correlation to obtain robust estimates of the 99.9% LGD quantiles. As the reinterpretation of the formula leads to significantly higher capital requirement we propose to reduce the probability level e.g. to a more a realistic 99.5% currently used by the Solvency II proposal.
Sensitivity of the Regulatory Capital on the Definition of Default
According to Basle II the contribution of a receivable to the unexpected loss of a welldiversified portfolio as a percentage of the exposure is estimated by the formula The correlation ρ is set up by the regulator (e.g. 15% for mortgage loans, 4% for revolving loans, and somewhere between the two values depending on PD for other retail loans) while the parameters PD and LGD are estimated by the bank (in the IRBA approach).
The usual LGD estimation approach is based on a sufficiently large historical data set of a homogenous portfolio of receivables A in terms of product type, credit rating, and collateralization. The receivables have been observed for at least one year and we have a record : [0, 1] lA → of percentage losses () la on the exposure at default if default occurred or 0 otherwise for every a A ∈ , and an indicator function { : 0,1} dA → of default in the one year horizon. It seems natural to require that ()1 da = iff ()0 la > as in Tasche (2004) , however in practice such a condition is difficult to achieve. 
Since the definition of default does not change the distribution of losses implied by the reference data set the unexpected loss estimate given by (1) Figure 1 . Unexpected loss according to the Basle II formula if EL=PD⋅LGD=2% is fixed and PD varies from 2.5% to 5% ( 15% ρ = ).
It could be argued that the problem is solved by the requirement (Basle, 2005) on LGD to reflect downturn economic conditions or PD/LGD correlation. However this requirement given sufficiently rich historical data set is normally implemented using only the data set AA ′ ⊂ from years with economic downturn conditions and/or high-observed frequency of default. The PD, LGD parameters estimated from A′ and UL calculated according to (1) will again depend on the definition of default in the same way as above.
Alternative Single Factor Models
The single factor models of Frye (2000a Frye ( , 2000b , Pykhtin (2003) , Tasche (2004) , and others can be generally described as follows. Let the ( The expression for the unexpected loss may be decomposed into two parts corresponding to the unexpected default rate and loss given default:
Here we use the hard definition of default 0 H DL ⇔> while as explained above in practice we usually need to work with a softer definition of default. We will say that (,) DDXζ = r is a consistent notion of default provided 0 LD >⇒ . Then the unexpected loss may be in general decomposed as
The simplest version of the singled-factor model is probably the model proposed by the Tasche (2004) . The loss function (,) LLXζ = is driven by one standard-normally distributed
where X and ζ are independent standard-normally distributed, and ρ is their correlation. If L is assumed to have a cumulative probability distribution
L F → then we may express the loss function in the form
In a sense more natural model has been proposed by Frye (2000a Frye ( ,2000b which may be in a generalized for described as follows. 
The Pykhtin (2003) Since we are in particular interested in unexpected loss given default modeling let us compare the three models in this respect. The unexpected loss given (hard) default conditional on a value of the systemic factor can is expressed as It follows from the analysis done in the following Section (see e.g. Figure 3 ) that the density function in (5) (5) is much lower than the variance in the Frye's model given by (6) . To model losses in case of default we will use the beta distribution with minimum 0 and maximum 1 determined by its mean µ and standard deviation σ . Figure 2 
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The Tasche model in spite of its appealing simplicity turns out to be inappropriate if unexpected loss is to be factorized according to (2) . If the correlation is calibrated for the unexpected default rate calculation (i.e. around the regulatory values) then the portfolio LGD variance is too low compared to empirical observation. This follows for example from the study of Frye (2003) showing that LGD in bad years is almost twice the LGD in good years, or Frye (2000b) 
An Analysis of the Sensitivity of the Regulatory Capital Formula
The phenomenon described in Section 2 has been partially explained in Witzany (2008) using a Merton model based simulation where we argued that a softer definition of default terminates the asset value stochastic process sooner than a hard definition of default, thus reducing the variance of losses determined by the average LGD set at the time of default.
To provide a better analytical explanation of the difference between the real loss quantile and the regulatory loss quantile estimation (and its dependence on the definition of default)
we will use the Frye and Tasche one factor models as benchmarks against which we compare the regulatory unexpected loss estimation. In both the unexpected loss we need to estimate is given by 
coincides with the regulatory formula for the unexpected default rate. The difference between (8) and (7) lies in the second part of the formula (8), i.e. in [|] ELYy > where the regulation in general requires an average loss given default in the sense of the discussion above while the "real" unexpected loss (7) can be decomposed as
It appears obvious that [|,][|]
ELXxYyELYy =>>> , the full proof is unfortunately rather technical. The right hand side of the inequality can be written as To show that the regulatory unexpected loss is less than the Frye model unexpected loss is in fact much easier. In this case we just need to prove that
with the notation from Section 3. The left hand side simply equals to () () ydy Gyφ Next we want to show that the function
ULyPYyXx ELYy =>= > defined according to (8) 
is an increasing function of y . Note that the equation (13) 
Improved Regulatory Formula
In Section 3 we gave a general definition of one (systemic) factor model.
We have seen that if D is a consistent notion of default then the loss may be decomposed to LGDs with x being the α -quantile of X . The unexpected default rate is estimated consistently by the reasonably well by the regulatory formula (1). But we improve it significantly requiring that LGD is not the expected loss given default but the unexpected portfolio level loss given default (ULGD) on the 99.9% probability level. (1) ) . Figure 6 illustrates the account-level LGD density function given by F for a given set of parameters (with mass weight cure p at 0) and the transformed portfolio level LGD density function of
ELX derived from (15). 
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Unexpected loss estimated using the described technique is however still sensitive to the definition of default although Figure 8 shows that the sensitivity is moderate and opposite compared to the regulatory capital (unexpected loss estimation increases with softer definition of default). Another applicable solution is then to adjust the probability of (conventional soft) default p with the observed probability of cures cure p and then apply the hard default based formula (17) ( (1)
where unexpected loss given (hard default) is estimated according to (15) using the beta distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ .
Numerical Examples
We are going to compare the values of regulatory unexpected loss in different scenarios: unexpected loss in the Tasche model, and unexpected Figure 7 shows how it is difficult to align the Tasche and Frye model. If we fix 15% ρ = as the correlation related to unexpected default rate and the other parameters as specified below than in order to obtain the same unexpected loss in the Frye model as in the Tasche model the LGD correlation must be reduced down to 1% or even less. Such a calibration is n contradiction with empirical studies like Frye (2000b Frye ( , 2003 ρ values. Figure 9 finally compares the sensitivity the 99.9% regulatory UL and 99.5% Frye model UL (17) on the probability of default and expected loss given default, other parameters fixed. The 99.5% Frye UL turns out to be more sensitive than the regulatory UL with respect to the probability of default but less to the expected loss given default. Hence by an appropriate recalibration of the confidence level we do not obtain the same unexpected loss estimations in all scenarios but using the proposed model we obtain a better correspondence between the real risk and the economic capital, more robust calculations, and at the same time overall same average level of capital. 
Conclusion
We have demonstrated and analytically explained that the regulatory capital according to the Basle II formula is sensitive to the definition of default. We have shown that the problem may be relatively simply solved in the context of general single factor models requiring that the LGD parameter is reinterpreted as the 99.9% percentile of possible losses given default.
We have considered three particular one (systemic) factor models and concluded that the one with two idiosyncratic factors proposed by Frye is the most appropriate to implement practically our model. The best results are provided by the model where the observed probability of soft default is adjusted using the cure rate to obtain the probability of hard default (which can be fully determined only ex post). Since the extended model gives higher unexpected loss values the confidence level can be recalibrated to a lower value (e.g. 99.5%) to achieve comparable capital levels. The resulting formula, which could replace the regulatory formula, provides a more robust and economically more faithful estimates of unexpected credit losses.
